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Article 2

BLACKBERRIES AND BARNYARDS: PATENT
TROLLS AND THE PERILS OF INNOVATION
Gerard N. Magliocca*
[A] mong a host of dormant patents, some will be found which contain some new principle ...which the inventor, however, had failed
to render of any use in his own invention. And some other inventor, ignorant that such a principle had been discovered.., had the
genius to render it of great practical value ... when, lo! the patentsharks among the legal profession, always on the watch for such
cases, go to the first patentee and, for a song, procure an assignment of his useless patent, and at once proceed to levy black-mail
upon the inventor of the valuable patent.
-Senator

Isaac Christiancy1

INTRODUCTION

Patent law almost never fires the imagination of the general public, but for the first time in over a century we are in the midst of a
vigorous debate about the patent system. The man on the street (at
least the ones on high-tech streets) started paying more attention to
patents once he learned that an infringement suit might deprive him
of his precious Blackberry wireless service. 2 That action was brought
© 2007 Gerard N. Magliocca. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis. J.D., Yale
University 1998; B.A., Stanford University, 1995. Thanks to Dan Cole, Kevin Collins,
Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman, Tim Wu, and the members of the 2006 Works-InProgress Intellectual Property Colloquium for their comments.
1 8 CONG. REc. 307 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy).
2 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding the Blackberry manufacturer liable for infringement and upholding an
injunctive remedy), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006); Yuki Noguchi, Government
Enters Fray over Blackberry Patents, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12, 2005, at DI (stating that over
three million Americans use Blackberries); Tim Wu, Weapons of Business Destruction:
How a Tiny Little "PatentTroll" Got Blackberry in a Headlock, SLATE, Feb. 6, 2006, http://
www.slate.com/id/2135559; see also Mark Heinzl & Amol Sharma, RIM to Pay NTP
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by a "patent troll," which is a derogatory term for firms that use their
patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture
technology.3 Concern about these suits is now so acute that a coalition of high-tech companies recently urged the Supreme Court to
4
respond by revising settled law on patent infringement remedies.
Though the Justices declined this invitation in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC,5 Congress is still considering legislation that would
6
achieve the same goal through other means.
Like most fresh legal questions, the debate on patent trolls is long
on passion and short on proof. Critics claim that these firms are little
more than blackmailers who put a crippling tax on productive enterprises. 7 Others assert that so-called trolls spur innovation by investing
in undercapitalized projects and reducing transaction costs for small
inventors who are routinely robbed by large corporations. 8 The only
$612.5 Million to Settle Blackberry Patent Suit, WALL ST. J., March 4, 2006, at Al (describing the settlement of the case).
3 See Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let's Build a PIT to Catch the
Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 367 (2005) (noting that the term "patent troll"
was coined at Intel). Some observers prefer to call these firms nonpracticing-entities
(NPEs). Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 165 (2006). This Article uses the word troll because it is more colorful.
4 See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Ass'n
in Support of Petitioners, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006)
(No. 05-130) [hereinafter Computer & Commc'ns Ind. Ass'n Brief]; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130); Brief
of Time Warner Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130).
5 126 S.Ct. 1837, 1839-40 (2006) (reaffirming the traditional test for injunctive
relief in patent infringement cases). eBay did reject the Federal Circuit's holding that
injunctions should always issue for patent infringement, see id. at 1841, but this fell
well short of what the anti-troll forces wanted.
6 See Patents Depend on Quality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006);
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); cf Michael J. Meurer,
Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 509, 525-44 (2003) (presenting various ideas to reduce frivolous intellectual
property litigation).
7 See David G. Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open PostGrant Review, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9, 1 7, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/
dltr/articles/2005dltr0009.html (quoting testimony of witnesses who called trolls
"'bottom feeders' who buy 'improvidently-granted patents from distressed companies
for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses"' (citations omitted)); Ferrill,
supra note 3, at 376-78 (summarizing these attacks).
8 See Brief of Amici Curiae Qualcomm Inc. & Tessera, Inc. in Support of Respondent at 8-11, eBay, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Qualcomm Inc. & Tessera, Inc. Brief]; Brief of the United Inventors Ass'n & Technology Licensing Corp. as
Amici Curiae in Support of MercExchange, L.L.C., on the Merits at 6-8, eBay, 126 S.
Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130); Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae
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thing that both sides might agree upon is that there is no real evidence about the impact that trolls are having on technology investment, which makes drawing policy conclusions in this area especially
hazardous.
This Article provides some perspective on the troll issue by pointing out a historical parallel that has received no attention. It turns out
that these opportunistic licensors were also active in the nineteenth
century.9 Called "patent sharks," they bought dormant agricultural
patents and then sued farmers who were unknowingly using protected
technology. 10 This brass knuckles tactic outraged rural activists and
led to the same calls for sweeping patent reform that we hear now."
At that time, the growth of sharks was blamed on excessive patent
remedies, incompetent examiners, and the lack of compulsory licensing. 12 Today, many of the same alleged defects are being blamed for
in Support of Respondent at 18-22, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter
Law & Econ. Professors' Brief]; see also Ronald J. Mann, Do PatentsFacilitateFinancing
in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1024 (2005) ("[T]rolls are serving a function as intermediaries that specialize in litigation to exploit the value of patents that
cannot be exploited effectively by those that have originally obtained them. That is
not in and of itself a bad thing.").

9 See Ferrill, supra note 3, at 375-76 (describing patent trolls as opportunistic
licensors). This term is apt because trolls seek a lump sum payment after a firm is
already using the technology, which looks like a license made under duress.
10 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 50, at 123 (1878) [hereinafter PATENT TESTIMONY] (additional argument of J.H. Raymond) (criticizing "those who are justly called patent

sharks" and the "large number of patents that are good for nothing except as the
bases for infringement suits"). See generally Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and AgrarianDiscontent, 1875-1888, 34 Miss. VALLEY HisT. REV. 59 (1947) (describing this controversy in detail).
11 See 11 CONG. Rrc. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Voorhees) (stating that
"there is a system that cannot be described accurately by any milder term than blackmail going on upon the farmers of this country" and urging the creation of an innocent user defense to infringement); 10 CONG. REc. 102 (1879) (statement of Sen.
Butler) (introducing a petition from the Grange calling for patent reform); 8 CONG.
REC. 303 (1878) (statement of Sen. Windom) (denouncing patent sharks' "blackmailing extortions" and supporting legislation to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in patent cases).
12 See 11 CONG. Ric. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) (stating that a
patent owner "should make no recovery of any amount, whether as damages or costs,
if the defendant established the fact that he was an innocent purchaser of the article
in open market, and used it in the cultivation of his own farm"); 8 CONG. REc. 307
(1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy) (rattling off a series of dubious patents and
arguing that "if there had been no Patent Office in existence, and the discretion of
Congress had been appealed to upon the merits of each case, not one of them would
have been granted"); Hayter, supra note 10, at 77-78. Hayter quotes the Grange's
1874 resolution calling for Congress to amend the patent laws "'by providing that any
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the explosion in trolls.' 3 That comparison suggests the counterintuitive point that simple farm inventions from the past can shed light on
our current troubles with high-tech patents.
The chief lesson that emerges from this comparison is that certain types of patents are more vulnerable to trolls than others. Opportunistic licensers flourish when there is a large gap between the cost of
getting a patent and the value that can be captured with an infringement action. This sort of arbitrage is likely to occur when: (1) those
being sued cannot easily substitute away from the disputed technology; (2) the average scope of improvements in the industry is incremental, which makes the outcome of infringement litigation hard to
14
gauge; and (3) the cost of acquiring and retaining patents is low.
Farm tools and modern technology patents-share this set of traits,
albeit for different reasons, and hence they have suffered more from
1 5
trolls than other types of patents.
The other lesson that can be drawn from the Gilded Age experience is that the flood of opportunistic litigation cannot be stemmed
through substantive changes in patent rights. 16 First, industries unafparty shall have a right to use them by payment of a reasonable royalty."' Id. (quoting
Michigan Farmer,VI (Mar. 9, 1875)).
13 See Brief of Rembrandt IP Management, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 14, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of Rembrandt
IP Management, LLC] ("[W]hat Yahoo and other amici are really demanding is that
nonusers be subject to a regime of compulsory licensing .. ");Amy L. Landers, Let
the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of IntellectualProperty Law, 46
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 343-47 (2006) (claiming that flaws in how infringement
royalties are calculated create trolls); infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the complaints about the Patent Office).
14 This last observation draws from Clarisa Long's work on the role of information costs in shaping intellectual property. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent
and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 470 (2004) ("As the concepts and boundaries of
protected goods become more subjective, observers will have a harder time understanding and obeying their propertarian duties if legal rules do not accommodate by
lowering information costs along other margins.").
15 Farm patents fit this description because there was an ill-fated attempt between
the 1860s and 1880s to classify them as industrial design. See Gerard N. Magliocca,
OrnamentalDesign and Incremental Innovation,86 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 874-80 (2003). In
that era, the Patent Office provided design patents for changes in form that were
deemed "useful." See Ex parte Crane, 1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 7, 7-8, reprinted in HECTOR T. FENTON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 225, 226 (Philadelphia, William J.
Campbell 1889). This new and lower standard led to chaos as opportunistic licensers
took out "design" patents on plows, shovels, and every other basic farm tool. See infra
Part II.A.
16 The patent system as a whole does need a shakeup, but the point is that this is
unnecessary to address the troll issue. For some comprehensive proposals, see FED.
TRADE COMM'N,

To PROMOTE INNOVATION (2003), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/
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fected by trolls view these proposals as harmful to their interests and
lobby hard against them. As a result, every effort to address the issue
through a comprehensive solution has failed in Congress.1 7 Second,
since trolls and sharks succeed as long as they reach settlements, a
substantive solution will be ineffective because most of these cases
never get to court. So long as there is significant uncertainty about
whether an infringement suit will succeed, defendants will tend to settle. In the nineteenth century, Congress eliminated this risk by wiping
out the patents that were fueling opportunistic litigation.1 8 This suggests that abolition may be the only solution for modern trolls, at least
with respect to patents for business methods and software.' 9 If that
medicine seems too strong, then the Patent Office should escalate the
fees that firms must pay to maintain their patents, which would make
speculation in dormant ones more costly.
2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE &JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DiSCONTENTS 170-207 (2007).
17 None of the proposals to deal with patent sharks were ever passed by Congress,
though some got through the House of Representatives. See 13 CONG. REC. 3952-55
(1882) (debating in the Senate the passage of a bill creating an innocent user defense
in infringement suits); 10 CONG. REc. 768-69 (1880) (transcribing the same debate in
the House). Supporters of the status quo felt that weakening patent rights would only
hurt small inventors and help trusts. See 13 CONG. REc. 3952 (1882) (statement of
Rep. Robinson) (stating that many patentees "are confronted not by farmers, not by
innocent purchasers, but by great corporations that attempt to fight down the inventor and rob him of all the benefits of his invention"). Today, the drug industry is the
best example of patentees who are uninterested in broad reform. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America in Support of Respondent, eBay, 126 S.Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (contending that patent law does not need an
overhaul); see also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls:
The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 693 (2006)
("Large biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical companies (biotech/pharma)
do not face the same threat that their info-tech counterparts face. This lack of cohesiveness has likely delayed or prevented the passage of some of the proposed patent
reforms.").
18 Act of May 9, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-109, 32 Stat. 132 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 171 (2000)); see also WILLIAM L. SYMONS, THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 19
(1914) (describing a 1902 statute that raised the threshold for granting design patents); Magliocca, supranote 15, at 878-79 (explaining how this Act and rulings of the
Patent Office ended the practice of mixing functional and esthetic elements).
19 Compare State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting a business method exception for patentability of software), with Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software
and Business-Method Patents,43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 823, 833-38 (2003) (explaining
why these inventions do not deserve patent protection); see also eBay, 126 S.Ct. at
1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that business method patents are especially
prone to trolls).
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Part I of this Article defines trolls and shows why patents are
prone to surprise litigation that can be viewed as a holdup. Part II
reviews the similar debate over patent sharks that occurred after the
Civil War. Part III connects this experience to modern trolls by showing that in each instance the patented items shared a distinctive bundle of traits that caused a surge in opportunistic suits. Part IV
concludes by comparing each era's proposed remedies before suggesting that we curb opportunistic suits by repealing certain types of
patents or by sharply increasing maintenance fees to discourage
sandbagging.
I.

OPPORTUNISTIC LICENSING IN PATENT

No area of the law is free from vexatious litigation, but in the
patent field the subject is garnering special attention. The question of
whether a given suit is a shakedown is in the eye of the beholder, but
this Part strives nonetheless to explain what trolls are and why patents
give them a ready home. Once that baseline is established, the discussion considers the sharply contrasting views about these firms and
their effect on technology.
A.

Some Nasty Surprises

In essence, trolls bring infringement suits based on a patent that
was not enforced previously but is being used by others as if the knowhow is in the public domain. The ensuing litigation comes as a surprise to a defendant, which is why these suits are analogized to mythical trolls that hid under bridges and leapt out to demand a ransom
from travelers. 20 Defendants facing this sort of lawsuit are placed in a
tough spot because the item in question is already being made and
usually cannot be redesigned without incurring substantial costs.
Moreover, plaintiffs are entitled to seek injunctive relief that could
shut down production of an entire product line, which gives them
powerful leverage in settlement negotiations. 2 1 Consequently, many
20 See Donald J. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 336, 340 (2005) ("[A] troll hides under bridges, metaphorically speaking,
waiting for companies to produce and market products, that is, to approach and cross
the bridge. The ugly, evil troll then leaps up and demands a huge toll, that is, a
licensing fee settling actual or threatened patent litigation, litigation that could result
in an injunction halting the product line.").
21
See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[A]n injunction, and
the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.").
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firms settle even if the underlying claim is weak because the risk of
going to trial is too great.
One reason that this scenario unfolds so often is that the existence of a patent is easy to overlook. Due to the complexity of their
content, no simple search can ensure that a technology is not already
patented. 22 Indeed, the best proxy for whether something is patented
is whether a patent is being enforced. Thus, a firm that develops and
then sells an item for an extended period of time has every reason to
think that the coast is clear with respect to patent law. Unfortunately,
that also means that they will sink huge sums into their product and
23
be more vulnerable to a holdup.
Moreover, the risk presented by these surprise suits is high
because patent law holds a defendant liable for infringement even if it
does not know that an item is patented. 24 While trademark law considers the intent of an alleged infringer and gives an innocent user the
benefit of the doubt, patent law does not.25 Likewise, the indepen-

dent creator of a copyrighted work cannot be held liable for infringement, but patent law rejects this exception. 26 Thus, the troll's
advantage of surprise is not just tactical; patent law actually imposes
strict liability as part of its general policy of providing the strongest
possible intellectual property rights.
Though it is easy to see the negative consequences that flow from
overlooking a dormant patent, a more perplexing question is why so
many patents are not being enforced. One answer is that firms
22 This does not mean it is impossible to conduct a patent search. If that was
true, then the disclosure requirement would be meaningless. The point is that people engaged in due diligence are more likely to miss relevant patents than something
simple like a trademark, where a search can quickly identify any related words that are
registered for a particular class of goods.
23 That vulnerability is increased by the presumption that a patent is valid, see 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2000), and the requirement that alleged infringers must prove invalidity
by "clear and convincing" evidence, see Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int'l, 316 F.3d
1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
24 Reformers in the nineteenth century sought to create such a defense. See infra
note 96 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g.,
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961) (stating the test for trademark infringement, which includes an inquiry into a
junior user's intent). Patents, unlike copyrights, also have no fair use exception that
allows courts to immunize users from infringement liability on public policy reasons.
See generally Maureen O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. Rv. 1177 (2000) (arguing for a fair use defense in patent to address certain market and licensing failures).
26 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974); Long, supra
note 14, at 529 ("[C]opyright imposes a rule of actual notice for liability (at least in
theory), whereas patent law imposes a rule of constructive notice.").
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acquire an invention and then refuse to do anything until the technology becomes an industry standard.2 7 This behavior is akin to setting a
deliberate trap and is not pennitted elsewhere in the law.28 Moreover,
this strategy is risky because it involves foregoing certain revenue for
the uncertain prospect of greater rewards in the future. Thus, most
patent owners do not take this route.2 9 While bad actors grab the
lion's share of attention, the claim that most opportunistic patent suits
are based on intentional traps is not persuasive.
A more realistic assessment of dormancy starts with the recognition that firms often acquire patents for reasons other than manufacturing and licensing. Recent scholarship indicates that many firms
build a patent portfolio to "signal" potential partners that they have a
powerful research and development arm.3 0 Dormant patents send
this signal as well as ones that are enforced. A strong portfolio also
lets firms reduce their transaction costs by entering into cross-license
swaps where each gets access to the other's patents.3 1 In this scheme,
patents serve as bargaining chips and will not be enforced unless the
licensing partner tries to defect. 32 The threat of tit-for-tat retaliation
27 See Mann, supra note 8, at 1027 (discussing "the strategy of waiting after a patent has been issued while an industry advances using the covered technology and
then suing widely for infringement only after the industry has become locked into the
technology").
28 For the classic condemnation of this activity, see Bird v. Holbrook, (1828) 4
Bing. 628, 635-39, 130 Eng. Rep. 911, 914-15 (C.P.) (holding that spring guns and
man traps on property were unreasonable).
29 Of course, this view rests on the assumption that the patent is valuable for
something other than litigation. A troll might seek out patents that are vague or
borderline invalid because they are ideal for lawsuits. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (KennedyJ, concurring) (noting that the "potential vagueness and suspect validity" of some business method patents creates special
concerns when injunctive relief is available); Mann, supra note 8, at 1026 ("To the
extent problems with patent quality make it hard to predict whether a particular patent is or is not valid, they increase the uncertainty and thus the threat value of trollish
litigation."); cf Law & Econ. Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 19 ("[Tjhe concern
about 'trolls' might reflect anxiety about the uncertainty of the scope and validity of
patents, as well as the high cost of patent litigation-both of which provide potential
opportunities for 'trolls' to exploit even weak or low-value patents.").
30 See generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 643-58 (2002)
(exploring this issue).
31 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
1495, 1504-05 (2001) (explaining how cross-licensing works).
32 See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 26-27 (2005) ("[T]he defensive patenting theory holds that firms acquire patents to ward off possible lawsuits by using the patents as bargaining chips with potential plaintiffs."). Another possibility is that firms will acquire patents simply to prevent
their competitors from having them. See Robert C. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solic-
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among these repeat players reduces the risk of dormant patents
springing to life. 3 3 But trolls are immune from this constraint because
they are the quintessential one-shot players who are not interested in
cooperative pooling arrangements. 34 Instead, these firms acquire
portfolios designed for other purposes and start enforcing them
strictly.

35

The final category of dormant patents comes from distressed
start-ups that either go bankrupt trying to bring their inventions to
market or sell their portfolio for pennies on the dollar because they
do not have any other assets. This also happens regularly, in part
because many inventions do not work when reduced to practice.
While there is uncertainty about how many copies a book will sell or
whether a brand name will be appealing, there is zero risk that they
will not function at all. 36 Even if an invention does work, a patent

owner may lack the capital or expertise to turn technology into a profitable invention or license. Finally, a given patent's value might not
be realized until it is paired with complements that do not exist until
after the original inventor is out of business. All of this means that
trolls, who are really just bargain hunters, will always have plenty of
dormant patents to choose from.
Accordingly, patent law provides a nurturing environment for
opportunistic licensing because: (1) it is easy to overlook a dormant
patent; (2) once dormant patents are acquired and used in an
infringement suit, a defendant faces a strict liability standard; and (3)
there are many reasons why patents lay dormant.

itude: IntellectualProperty Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2222 (2000) (discussing this strategy).
33 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 16, ch. 3, at 35-38. The only drawback to
this solution is that it forces firms to apply for worthless patents in order to have a
sufficient stockpile to deter competitors. See id. ch. 3, at 30-31.
34 See Mann, supra note 8, at 1023 (calling trolls "firms that have no interest in a
licensing equilibrium because they produce no products of their own").

35 Actually, the most effective self-help strategy would be to snatch up any undervalued dormant patents before trolls can get them. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew
Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTEu. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 2-3 (2005) (explaining how Novell did this when Commerce One, a software firm with a healthy patent
portfolio, went bankrupt). Of course, this would impose what can be described as a
wasteful expense since the entire object would be to ensure that the patents never get
used.
36 See Dratler, supra note 19, at 845-46 (laying out the distinction between market risk and technological risk).
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Different Perspectives on Trolls

While the broad factors that contribute to patent trolls are clear,
assessing the impact of this litigation on innovation is tricky. There is
no good empirical evidence on this question, and the debate seems to
turn largely on a hunch about whether large firms or small ones drive
technological development. 37 Those who worship at the altar of startups see trolls as necessary intermediaries; those who swoon at the big
behemoths view trolls as a nuisance. This subpart briefly lays out the
competing perspectives without taking sides.
A positive story of opportunistic licensors would stress their role
in leveling the playing field for creators with limited resources. It may
be shocking to learn that trolls are not the only parties that engage in
opportunistic behavior. Advocates for small inventors in garages
argue that corporations see start-ups as easy fodder for a "scorchedearth" strategy of stealing their patents and fighting an infringement
suit in the hope of exhausting a plaintiff's funds.3 8 This approach is as
deliberate and pernicious as a trap set by a troll and should also be
condemned. 39 When large firms engage in that sort of conduct,
opportunistic litigation is simply vindicating the rights of the little guy.
Furthermore, these trolls can supply much-needed capital to small
entities by buying their dormant patents. 40 From this perspective,
trolls invest in undercapitalized firms and thereby make a significant
41
contribution to research and development.
These points spotlight a crucial problem in assessing the troll
issue, which is determining how long a grace period patent owners
should get before they are expected to enforce their rights. There is
37 Troll supporters, of course, contend that the lack of evidence supports their
view that no action should be taken. See Qualcomm Inc. & Tessera, Inc. Brief, supra
note 8, at 8 ("We submit that the absence of any actual examples exposes a fatal flaw
in the eBay argument.").
38 See id. at 5 (making this point forcefully); Brief of Rembrandt IP Management,
LLC, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that "[p]atent litigation is notoriously expensive,"
which "presents ample opportunities for well-funded corporations to run the clock
with an endless stream of motions and discovery requests").
39 One could well say that the user of the technology is the opportunistic licensor
in this situation, but since the common understanding of trolls is that they are always
plaintiffs this example is still useful.
40 The question of whether this capital is, in fact, much needed depends on a
policy judgment about how much innovation comes from small inventors. Thatjust
reinforces the point that the troll debate is wrapped up in a larger discussion about
the industrial economics of technology.
41 If the patents are purchased in a bankruptcy sale, then this argument does not
work as well. One could say, though, that providing creditors with a better return
facilitates investment in start-ups.
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little doubt that the failure to use or license a patent for a significant
period creates reliance problems for those who reasonably conclude
that the technology is in the public domain. First, if the invention is
widely available then there is no benefit to society from a suit by the
original inventor or its successor. Second, such litigation imposes a
burden on research and development by increasing the risk involved
with bringing out a new product. Finally, one might think that it is
unjust enrichment for a dormant patent owner to collect from those
who perfect the technology. The dilemma for policymakers is that
most patentees need some time after the patent is granted to either
bring the invention to market or decide that this is not feasible and
sell the rights to someone who can. 42 If the incubation period is too
short, that could hurt innovation by discouraging small firms from
investing in research or forcing them to choose trade secret protec43
tion with all of its drawbacks.
In sum, though the rival theories about trolls are clear, crafting a
solution that reduces the harm they cause without damaging other
legitimate interests is hard in the absence of concrete proof. Luckily,
there is one fruitful source of information that has not been tapped.
II.

SHARKS ON THE FARM

History may seem like a poor tool for analyzing intellectual property due to the swift pace of technological change, but this Part argues
that the debates of the nineteenth century contain a treasure trove of
information on patent trolls. During that era, there were complaints
about patent sharks that engaged in similar behavior with respect to
farm tools. Moreover, the arguments made about those activities echo
the ones being made by their modem counterparts.
A.

A Rich Harvest of Agricultural Patents

Since opportunistic licensors need lots of dormant patents to
prosper, the surge of patents granted in the 187 0s and 1880s is a good
42 Realistically, a start-up is more likely to need this grace period because a small
firm has less experience in bringing products to market or evaluating the tradeoffs
involved in selling the technology. Thus, those who believe that large corporations
are the engine of innovation will tend to want a shorter dormancy period and be less
tolerant of trolls.
43 The most notable limitation is that trade secret protection forces a firm to
expend significant resources to keep the information confidential and deprives the
public of the benefits yielded by patent disclosure. For a fine summary, see Robert G.
Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of justification, 86 CAL. L. REv.
241, 266-70 (1998).
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place to start looking for historical clues. In 1876, the Patent Commissioner told Congress that "'[d]uring the past seven years a larger
number of applications for patents were filed and patents granted
44
than during the entire seventy-eight years preceding.' ,,
Some of this
growth can be attributed to the restoration of peace following the
Civil War and Reconstruction, but another factor that gets less attention was a change in the patentability standard that ended up having a
strong impact on agricultural inventions.
During the late 1860s, the Patent Office basically decided to create a new design patent that encouraged incremental innovation by
making it easier to acquire protection. 45 In Ex parte Crane,4 6 the Commissioner held that applicants could receive a design patent for most
functional improvements. 4 7 While conceding that the item at issuea box for women's furs-could not meet the test for a utility patent,
the Commissioner was "unable to perceive any good reasons why
designs for utility are not fairly and properly embraced within the
[design] statute. ' 48 This conclusion was driven by his desire to
expand the subject matter of patent, which he deemed inadequate:
There is a large class of improvements in manufactured articles that
are not regarded as inventions, or as coming within the scope of
general patent laws .... They promote the best interests of the
country, as well as the creations of inventive talent. It seems to me

to have been the intent of Congress to extend to all such cases a
49
limited protection and encouragement.

44 8 CONG. REc. 307 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy) (quoting the
Commissioner).
45 A more complete account is presented in Magliocca, supra note 15, at 874-80.
There was a dispute over whether this test was new or just codified existing practice.
Compare Ex parte Crane, 1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 7, 7, reprinted in FENTON, supra note
15, at 225, 225 ("The construction which has been given to that act by the office ever
since its passage in 1842, is that it relates to designs for ornament [only] ...."),with
Ex parte Bartholomew, 1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 103, 105, reprinted in FENTON, supra
note 15, at 229, 234 (contending that "no such 'uniform practice' has existed").
46

1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 7, 7, reprinted in FENTON, supra note 15, at 225, 225-26.

47

See id. at 226.

48

Id.

49 Id. at 226. This liberal interpretation of the design patent statute was not
unprecedented. Prior to 1870, the Patent Office used that law to protect many trademarks even though that type of subject matter was not expressly covered. See Ex parte
King, 1870 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 109, 109, reprinted in FENTON, supra note 15, at 246-47
(noting this practice and holding that the new trademark statute superceded the custom); SYMONS, supra note 18, at 35 ("[S]ome two hundred design patents were issued
for 'designs for trademarks.'").
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Congress appeared to affirm the Commissioner's position when, in an
1870 revision of the design patent law, it changed the subject matter
in the text from any "new and original" design to any "new, useful,
50
and original" design.
The new standard was criticized for introducing uncertainty into
the patent examination process. 51 Stated simply, the problem was
that almost any farm tool could be classified as a design. Crane noted
that "[b]y some it is said that any form or design that is most useful is
also most pleasing. It would be impossible, in the view of such persons, to make any improvement in utility that did not at the same time
add to the ornamental and artistic." 52 In essence, the Patent Office
by allowing
was lowering the bar for patents on functional changes
53
inquiry.
that
towards
count
to
qualities
their esthetic
Putting aside the merits of this approach, its main consequence
was that the Patent Office was swamped with new applications. A subsequent Commissioner watched this gold rush with mounting alarm,
arguing that "[t] he idea of stretching the section in question to cover
slight changes in the form of crowbars, spades, plows, scrapers, &c., is
simply ridiculous, and tends to bring the whole system into disrepute. '54 He focused his ire on "imposters" that "desire a design patent
merely to obtain the right to put the word 'patented' upon their manufacture, and thereby deceive the public and wrong real inventors, for
they well know that not one person in ten thousand will ever learn the
50 Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198, 209-10 (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000)); seeExparteFenno,1871 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 52, 53, reprinted in
FENTON, supra note 15, at 250, 252. The legislative history sheds no light on why
Congress made this change.
51 See Ex parte Parkinson, 1871 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 251, 252-53, reprinted in FENTON, supra note 15, at 257, 259 (stating that "[t]he practice of the Office in granting
design patents has been not only liberal but lax" and that the recent precedents
"opened the door to design patents far too widely").
52 See Ex parte Crane, 1869 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 7, 7, reprinted in FENTON, supra note
15, at 225, 226; see also Ex parte Fenno, 1871 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 52, 53, reprinted in
FENTON, supra note 15, at 250, 252 (holding that a purely functional improvement
could get a design patent even though it could not get a utility patent).
53 See Ex parte Parkinson, 1871 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 251, 252, reprinted in FENTON,
supra note 15, at 257, 258 ("The legislature never intended ...to let down the standard for patents. It was never contemplated to grant a design patent for every possible change of form that might be given to a machine or article of manufacture.").
54 Id. at 259; see 8 CONG. REC. 308 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy) (attacking the patents granted "in many trifling improvements in farming implements, in
gates, gate-hinges and latches, and a thousand other things of like trivial nature");
PATENT TESTIMONY, supra note 10, at 111 ("I should like to notice, because I think the
time has come when it should be noticed, and noticed very severely, the issue of patents out of the Patent Office for the most insignificant things in the world .... ).
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fact that the patent only covers the design." 5 5 Although reformers
attempted to address this criticism, during the next two decades the
Patent Office issued conflicting rulings that probably just made the
56
problem worse.

B. Royalty Agents and Nuisance Suits
By the mid-1870s, these patent imposters started commanding
public attention. The only secondary source that discusses this issue is
an article by Earl W. Hayter, an agrarian historian writing in the
1940s. 5 7 That scholarship, which was understandably overlooked by
legal scholars, is backed by a fresh look at the primary materials that
Hayter relied upon as well as others that he did not discuss.
These records reveal that opportunistic licensors were actively
extracting favorable settlements from farmers. In their acquisition of
dormant patents, the modus operandi of patent sharks was similar to
the one employed by modern trolls, as Hayter described in language
that should not be paraphrased:
Beginning with the seventies and eighties a large number of articles
for farm use were patented by inventors throughout the country,
but these were often insignificant and would have to be sold so
cheaply that inventors found it impossible to realize any money on
them; in such cases they would generally allow the patents to lie
dormant. Manufacturers frequently infringed these inactive patents
and put them on the market in large numbers. The patentees, seeing their inventions in general use among the farmers, would sud58
denly come to life and insist upon their legal rights.

This passage encapsulates what makes dormant patents a problem,
which is that: (1) they are not enforced for a long period of time; (2)
subsequent manufacturers use the patented technology and make it
55 Exparte Parkinson, 1871 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 251, 252, reprinted in FENTON, supra
note 15, at 257, 259; see Hayter, supra note 10, at 65 (noting that these "moonshiners"
also "deceived the purchasers by using false trademarks and license tags on their
products").
56 CompareEx parte Shoeninger, 15 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 384 (1879), reprinted in
FENTON, supra note 15, at 301 (reaffirming Crane), with Ex parteSchulze-Berge, 42 Off.
Gaz. Pat. Office 293 (1888), reprinted in FENTON, supra note 15, at 324 (overruling
Shoeninger). I say probably because it is difficult to assess the informal practices of the
Patent Office in that era. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the instability in the formal
standard created more confusion for the examiners.
57 See Hayter, supranote 10, at 59 (describing "the basis of this study" as "what the
farmers referred to as the 'outrages of the patent right system"'). Hayter later
reprinted a revised version of this piece as a chapter of a book on agrarian discontent.
See EARL W. HAYIER, THE TROUBLED FARMER 211-27 (1968).
58 Hayter, supra note 10, at 61 (footnotes omitted).
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profitable without being aware of its protected status; and (3) once

59
they become established the patent owner launches a surprise suit.

The original inventors brought some of these infringement actions,
but most came from third parties that specialized in litigation and
60
bought up the dormant patents.
The leading difference between nineteenth-century sharks and
contemporary trolls is that the former sued consumers of infringing
articles rather than their manufacturers. 6 1 Royalty agents fanned out
across the country and approached farmers with the claim that their
tools were patented. 62 These agents would threaten to sue unless they
63
received a settlement of between ten and one hundred dollars.
Since the average farmer knew little about patent law and had no way
59 See 11 CONG. REc. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Voorhees) ("Patentees of
articles stand by and see other persons manufacture the same article and sell it until it
is spread all over a vast extent of country and in general use. Then their agents commence visiting those who have purchased these articles and have them in use."); cf.
PATENT TESTIMONY, supra note 10, at 123 (stating that sharks used "practically useless
patents [that] come into value only at a very late stage in their history, after the line of
inventions has proceeded to a practical result").
60 See Hayter, supra note 10, at 62 ("Old claims, or 'bottom' patents as they were
called, that had become inoperative and unremunerative to the inventor were often
bought up at a small fee by a patent 'ring'... ."); see also 8 CONG. REc. 1371 (1879)
(statement of Rep. Deering) ("It is not the meritorious inventor that reaps the reward
or realizes the profit of his industry and skill, but the greedy speculator, who lurks at
the door of his workshop and makes necessity his opportunity.").
61 Another distinction is that opportunistic licensors formed a cartel called the
"patent ring" and obtained extensions in the term of protection and in the scope of
their patents by "manipulating" (i.e., bribing) Congress and the Patent Office. See
Hayter, supra note 10, at 62 (stating that firms sometimes persuaded examiners to
reissue a patent that covered subsequent improvements or obtained a seven-year
extension from Congress upon a showing that they did not receive adequate compensation). There are no allegations that modern trolls abuse the system in a similar
fashion.
62 See 8 CONG. REC. 271 (1878) (statement of Sen. Windom) ("I believe it is true
that there is not a farmer in this country to-day who is not liable to a score of suits or
more for the infringement of patents on his farming implements. There is something
about his plow, his harrow, his thrasher, or his reaper, some little insignificant thing
that nobody ever ought to have had a patent for, and never would upon a properly
administered patent system .... "); cf 8 CONG. REc. 1371 (1879) (statement of Rep.
Deering) (explaining that patent sharks "do not scruple to palm off any of the ten or
fifty thousand of utterly worthless patents, or to extort sums of money on unjust allegations of infringement").
63 See 11 CONG. REc. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Voorhees) ("A farmer when
notified that he has in use an article the manufacturer of which it is claimed has
infringed some patent right, with the alternative of paying the man who visits him
from fifty to one hundred dollars or being dragged to a United States court... settles
up, and the man goes on to the next."); 8 CONG. REC. 303 (1878) (statement of Sen.
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of determining whether the threat was credible, he almost always settled. 6 4 Even if someone did want to fight, the costs of seeking counsel
or defending the suit would exhaust the resources of all but the richest farmers. The value of each claim was small, but the sum of these
65
opportunistic licenses was considerable.
This was the Blackberry case of its day, as public outrage over the
intrusion of patent law into the lives of average people triggered
unprecedented scrutiny. Congressmen from rural states attacked "the
useless and dormant patents which have been granted, and to the evils
which result from their resuscitation by the Cossacks who follow the
army of inventors. '' 66 The Framers of the Constitution, one representative said, "never contemplated a system that would authorize or permit an army of swindlers to prey upon communities and plunder the
unwary and unsuspecting." 6 7 These opportunistic licensors were part
of that "class who prefer the game of chance to any regular business;
who are anxious to realize large profits from slender means and
efforts; men who always contrive to get on in the world without hard
work." 6 8 One Senator summed up the problem by asking if it was
"necessary to the success of invention that the great body of our people shall be exposed to exactions of this kind and find it cheaper to
69
pay than to defend themselves."
Farmers' organizations, led by the National Grange, tried to
address the problem but met relentless opposition. 7° Advocates for
Windom) ("There are today, as I am informed, five hundred [patent] suits for $10
each pending in the United States district court at Saint Paul.").

64 See, e.g., 11 CONG. REc. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Voorhees) ("The manufacturing company will stand on its legal rights and go into litigation quite as cheerfully as the other side, while the plain people of the country shrink from law, and
justly so, as they would from contagion, small-pox, or any other great calamity.").
65 See Hayter, supra note 10, at 67 (providing contemporary estimates on the scale
of the problem); cf PATENT TESTIMONY, supra note 10, at 109 (explaining how royalty
agents operated and stating that "this kind of blackmailing under the law amounts to
millions of dollars annually").
66 8 CONG. REc. 308 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy); see also Hayter, supra
note 10, at 73 ("The abuses of the patent system, as related to infringements and the
collection of royalty fees, became so acute, and the individual farmer so helpless to
cope with them, that organized efforts were made to voice his discontent.").
67 8 CONG. REc. 1371 (1879) (statement of Rep. Deering).
68 Id.; see also 13 CONG. REC. 3953-54 (1882) (statement of Rep. Burrows) (calling
sharks "insatiate vampires," and listing a series of specific settlements in one congressional district as "samples of the persecutions to which the farmers are subjected").
69 8 CONG. REC. 270 (1878) (statement of Sen. Kirkwood).
70 See Hayter, supra note 10, at 77-78 (describing the activities of the Grange and
noting that the number of petitions on this subject "ran a close second to those pertaining to Civil War pensions"); see also 7 CONG. REc. 2837 (1878) (noting the joint
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the industrial and creative lobbies countered that no reforms were
necessary and that any change would cripple innovation. 71 Hannibal
Hamlin, Abraham Lincoln's first vice president, 72 told the Senate that
"[t]here are hard cases, there are cases of extreme hardship . . .but

that hardship is hardly a sufficient justification, in my judgment, for
abolishing that system of patents which has accomplished so much in
this country. '73 The most famous supporter of the status quo was
none other than Thomas Edison, who said that the revisions would
"'not only act oppressively upon many inventors, but will strongly tend
to discourage and prevent the perfection of useful inventions by those
most fitted for that purpose, and most likely to accomplish it ....

It

would be very burdensome to me.'- 74 At this point, the debate on
patent sharks had reached the stage where we now find ourselvesroughly speaking-with respect to patent trolls.
In sum, the nineteenth century saw a burst of opportunistic
licensing that is comparable to the current state of affairs. The next
question worth exploring is why opportunistic licensors appeared in
force at these particular (and widely separated) times.
III.

PATENTS THAT ATTRACT TROLLS

The previous discussion provided two examples, modern technology and farming tools, where opportunistic licensing was a big concern. 75 Tellingly, these are also the only two times when this
resolutions passed by western legislatures requesting relief "from the oppression of
patent-right monopolies"). The specific proposals advanced by these parties are discussed in Part IV.
71 See Hayter, supra note 10, at 81 ("[P]rominent senators as Roscoe Conkling,
Orville H. Platt, George F. Hoar, and others saw only danger in these attempts to
revise the system; they ridiculed and minimized its alleged evils, pointing out the
immense value of many patents to farmers under the existing laws.").
72 See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 262-63 (1995) (describing Hamlin's role
as Lincoln's running mate in 1860).
73 8 CONG. REC. 272 (1878) (statement of Sen. Hamlin). For a criticism of Hamlin's view, see id. at 270 (statement of Sen. Windom) (stating that if this "means that
patents bought up by speculators for a mere nominal sum may be used to plunder
and oppress innocent people, who without notice of the existence of such patent have
purchased articles in open market ...I say let the system be abolished").
74 Hayter, supra note 10, at 81 (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from
Thomas A. Edison to Senator Benjamin F. Butler (Feb. 17, 1879)). Edison was acutely
aware of the importance of third parties for small inventors, since he could not have
continued his own research without that sort of backing. See PAUL ISRAEL, EDISON
41-42 (1998) ("Like most young inventors Edison had technical know-how but lacked
financial resources for experiments and patent expenses ....").
75 There is a related problem with "submarine patents," but that is mainly about
manipulating the application process to extend the term of protection. SeeJohn F.
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happened. 76 Though mindful of the hazards that come with drawing
conclusions from such a limited data set, this Part contends that only
certain types of patents breed trolls. Opportunistic behavior is more
likely to occur when there is a large gap between the cost of getting a
patent and the value of infringement suits.
A.

Stop Blaming the Patent Office

The traditional scapegoat for opportunistic litigation is the
incompetence of patent examiners. One activist during the 1880s said
that "[a] goodly portion of the patent wrongs have grown out of the
reckless methods of the patent office. It has been accustomed to
grant most of the applicants and let the questions of infringement be
fought out in the courts." 7 7 While saving most of their anger for the
sharks themselves, rural senators often lambasted the examiners for
granting patents on too many trivial or obvious items. 78 One even
listed some of these dubious patents, adding a quip about one issued
for a "bow and arrow" which he considered "very essential in the pre79
sent stage of human progress."
Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 491 (2004)
(describing these submarine patents); see also Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med.,
277 F.3d 1361, 1364-66 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (relying on laches to reject an applicant's
effort to double the length of protection by using dilatory tactics at the Patent Office).
Since applications are confidential, someone could set a trap by stalling during that
process to conceal a patent for years until it is granted and then "surfaces" to surprise
a defendant. This tactic works because once a patent is granted the protection starts
from the point when the application was filed.
76 Just to be clear, I am not saying that opportunistic licensors are absent outside
of the farming and technology examples discussed in the text. The only point is that

for most patents the incidence of trolls is relatively minor and can be tolerated as a
cost of doing business.
77 Hayter, supra note 10, at 64 (quoting S.A. Knapp, The Barbed Wire Controversy,
IOWA ST. REG. (Des Moines, Iowa), Feb. 9, 1881).
78 See, e.g., 8 CONG. REc. 306 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy) ("[M]uch
time and labor, I insist, have of late years been spent in the investigation of applications for patents for these trifling matters, which ought to have been promptly
rejected, as not, upon the whole, sufficiently useful and important to justify the issuing of patents"); id. at 269 (statement of Sen. Windom) ("I think I am safe in saying
that there are a hundred thousand patents to-day in the Patent Office of the United
States for little insignificant inventions . . . ."); Hayter, supra note 10, at 64 ("[T]he
great number of patents resulted from laxity in administering the law; that sufficient
care was not taken at the Patent Office to ascertain whether the inventions were really
novel; and that patents were granted on trifling modifications which required no
genius to originate and were therefore not entitled to protection.").
79 8 CONG. Rrc. 307 (1878) (statement of Sen. Christiancy).
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Today, anti-troll forces are also claiming that the Patent Office
issues far too many low quality patents.8 0 Instead of attacking the
examiners directly, the modern critique puts the blame on inadequate
funding and a perfunctory review process.8 1 These institutional flaws
might explain patents like the one recently granted for "an antigravity
space vehicle," which sits at the opposite pole of absurdity from a bow
and arrow.8 2 Thus, many of the reform proposals currently being
shopped around seek to dampen troll activity by beefing up the Patent
83
Office's staff or creating a post-grant opposition procedure.
There is certainly merit in these critical assessments of the Patent
Office. Low quality patents contribute to trolls in two ways. First, if a
patent is erroneously granted on something already in the public
domain (e.g., the wheel) then the effective dormancy period will be
exceptionally long. This in turn means that the sunk costs of other
users will be high when the troll brings its case. 84 Second, if examiners let especially vague patents issue then the uncertainty surrounding
what is protected will make it easier for opportunistic licensors to
wreak havoc. Understanding the scope of an ordinary patent is hard
enough. A defendant in an infringement suit based on an unclear
patent, though, faces even more risk of defeat.
Nevertheless, responsibility for patent trolls cannot be placed
entirely on sloppy patent examiners. This theory does not explain
why opportunistic licensors proliferated only twice in our history. If
80

See Computer& Commc'ns Ind. Ass'n Brief, supra note 4, at 14-15; see also FED.
supra note 16, ch. 3, at 40 (quoting a witness who testified that "the
lack of effective mechanisms to challenge questionable patents, the presumption of
validity, and 'a patent office that is generous to patent applicants' also facilitate the
use of hold-up strategies.").
81 See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 35, at 3-4 (stating that "[t]he current environment is a perfect breeding ground" for trolls since an underfunded and understaffed
Patent Office leads to the result "that thousands of ambiguous and dubious patents
are issued every year"); Wu, supra note 2 (stating that "[t]he examiners' union calls
the PTO a 'sweatshop,' and no wonder").
82 Wu, supra note 2 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,960,975 abstract (filed Mar. 14,
2005), which states that "the spacetime curvature imbalance ... provides for the space
vehicle's propulsion").
83 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 16, ch. 3, at 55 ("Several panelists argued
that if the PTO had more examiners, made a greater effort to keep experienced
examiners, and gave patent examiners more time to spend on their initial examination, the PTO would issue fewer questionable patents."); Barker, supra note 7,
20,
30-36 (describing how this process might work and noting that the FTC has endorsed
the idea).
84 This is just another way of saying that the novelty requirement in 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 (a)-(b) (2000) is a safeguard against patents that are worthless except as troll
weapons.
TRADE COMM'N,

1828

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

inadequate staff and flawed internal procedures were the problem,
then we should be swamped with these meddlesome suits most of the
time. Furthermore, even during periods when this litigation was prevalent the sharks (or trolls) only targeted certain patents. It is hard to
explain why the examiners at a particular time would mess up so badly
with respect to farm inventions or high-tech patents but perform well
otherwise. Thus, a logical hypothesis is that something else must be
85
partly responsible for the problem.
B.

The Conditionsfor Arbitrage

If the types of inventions being patented are related to the
growth of opportunistic suits, then there must be some substantive
link between complex information technology and basic farm tools.
While these types of inventions may seem like night and day, upon
closer examination common points do emerge about the risks that
these dormant patents present to defendants as compared to the
plaintiffs' acquisition costs.
In thinking about why certain patents might be more exposed to
trolls, the first question worth exploring is why the defendants in
these suits are so eager to settle. Two answers come to mind. First,
the cost of losing (damages or paying to escape an injunction) could
be high. Put another way, how hard is it for a firm to substitute from
the disputed technology and use something else? The harder the substitution is, the greater the leverage is for the troll. Second, the likelihood of losing could be high (or highly uncertain), which enhances a
troll's ability to coerce a settlement. Not surprisingly, patents susceptible to opportunistic licensors present both of these hazards in spades.
1.

Substitution Effect

On the substitution point, let us begin by examining the hightech patents (e.g., software and hardware) that are at the core of the
present troll problem. One notable point about these types of inventions is they are usually embedded in products that contain scores of
other patents. When that integration occurs and the item is being
made, the manufacturer cannot remove a given patent from this bundle without redesigning the entire device-it is like pulling a thread
85 Of course, there were some faulty post-examination procedures that Gilded
Age sharks used to their advantage. See supra note 61. Furthermore, there were a few
complaints about opportunistic suits that do not fit the model described in the text,
most notably suits concerning barbed wire. See The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S.
275, 292 (1892) (upholding the Glidden patent); Hayter, supra note 10, at 75-76
(describing the criticisms about patent royalty suits for barbed wire).
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from a tapestry. Thus, a troll need not hold the rights to a particularly
important or valuable patent to get a hefty settlement. Opportunistic
licensors can "capture not only the value of their inventions, but the
value of complementary assets and irreversible investments made by
defendants as well."8

6

In other words, the complex and interdepen-

dent nature of these patents makes it hard to substitute away from one
of them when a troll comes calling.
When the inquiry turns to farm implements, substitution was just
as hard for the opposite reason-the patented items were basic necessities. Farmers cannot do without plows, shovels, fences, and other
simple tools. Patent sharks, therefore, had these folks over a barrel
when the royalty agent appeared. Of course, the object of a
threatened suit could avoid liability by purchasing a noninfringing
version of the same tool. Yet that substitution was problematic
because most farmers were poor. So long as the money demanded by
the shark was less than the cost of buying a "clean" replacement, an
opportunistic licensor could profit from the difficulty involved in substituting because of a resource constraint.8 7 As a result, we can expect
trolls to sprout at both ends of the spectrum-very complex and very
simple-where the substitution effect is weak and the relative value
that trolls can extract is high.
2.

Marginal Improvements

The inability of defendants to escape a troll is also reflected in the
likelihood (or uncertainty) that an infringement suit will succeed.
After all, those sued by opportunistic licensors may conclude that,
although the cost of losing is high, a settlement should be rejected
because the probability of a troll winning is clearly low. One reason
why farmers were so willing to settle in the nineteenth century was
that many could not even afford lawyers to assess the merits of a claim
by a patent shark. Moreover, a common complaint about the design
patents granted following the Civil War was that it was "exceedingly
difficult to separate the form and configuration of a body from its
function." 88 As noted earlier, a vague patent makes it harder for
86 Mark A. Lemley, PatentingNanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REv. 601, 630 (2005); see
also Computer & Commc'ns Ind. Ass'n Brief, supra note 4, at 2-3 (stating that the law
lets "the patentee extract settlements that approach the costs of shutting down an
entire.product line, far in excess of what a reasonable royalty is likely to be").
87 This problem was compounded by the activity of peddlers who sold farmers
"noninfringing" tools backed by phony certificates guaranteeing their reliability. See
Hayter, supra note 10, at 65.
88

Ex parte Schulze-Berge, 42 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 293, 295 (1888), reprinted in
supra note 15, at 332; see also Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview,
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defendants to determine the scope of its protection and hence unwilling to take the risk of going to trial. 8 9
More important, assessing the probability of success for an
infringement suit is terribly challenging when the average advance
made by a patent is relatively small. In that case, a defendant will have
a difficult time distinguishing their technology from one owned by a
troll. Even if there is no literal infringement of a patent, under the
"doctrine of equivalents" an infringement occurs when an item is
functionally similar to a patent. 90 This does not mean that all modest
improvements are infringing. The point is that defendants facing a
suit under these circumstances face more uncertainty (and are thus
more likely to settle) than they would be if the average innovation
represented a big leap from the prior art.9 1
Information patents and farm tool designs are both characterized
by incremental change, though again for different reasons. For computer hardware or software, marginal advances are the norm because
these inventions yield greater benefits when they are linked together
into a network or use a common industry standard (e.g., Microsoft
Windows).92 The need for interoperability in information technology
means that innovations must conform to whatever standard is used
and get channeled into a narrow range. This is another consequence
of the integrated nature of technology that makes the costs of losing
infringement suits so high. Thus, the patents used by trolls are vulner34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1341 (1987) ("The dominant concern of the law protecting
designs of useful articles has been to keep design and utility separated.").
89 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. Though certain information
technology patents are also opaque (e.g., business methods and software), not all patents under attack by modern trolls share that trait. Computer hardware, for example,
does not seem especially unclear.
90 See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950);
cf.Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REx. 1, 41 (2001) ("The pattern of cumulative, sequential innovation
and reuse that prevails in the software industry creates the risk that software patents
will cast large shadows in infringement litigation. Specifically ... the temptation for
the trier of fact to find equivalence of improvements will be correspondingly
greater.").
91
See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 90, at 3-4 (calling for the doctrine of
equivalents to be applied narrowly for computer software).
92 See A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 147, 148 (1999) ("[T] he defining characteristic... of network industries is that
they involve products that are more valuable to purchasers or consumers to the extent
that those products are widely used."); see also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 90, at 41
("Software innovation is by nature largely incremental. It is rare for programs to be
rewritten entirely from scratch . . ").
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able because they work with each other and are likely to share significant traits.
As for farm implements, incremental improvements are typical
because of simplicity rather than interdependence. Though it sounds
a little glib, there are only so many ways to design a shovel. In other
words, industrial designers rarely achieve outstanding leaps because
they have a limited set of elements to work with. 93 Indeed, almost
every new design just involves rearranging basic elements (colors,
shapes, and materials) into a new pattern. As a result, almost every
innovation in industrial design is only slightly different from what
came before. 94 And when sharks appeared holding design patents in
basic tools, farmers were hard pressed to show that their shovel or
plow was not substantially similar to the patented version. Just as the
simplicity of farm tools made them hard to avoid using, the same quality made it harder to claim that they were noninfringing.
3.

Cheap Technology

The final condition that opportunistic licensors need to prosper
is low-cost patents. Arbitrage opportunities, after all, are curtailed as
transaction costs increase. If acquiring or retaining a patent was
expensive, then trolls would face more risk. For the examples of
information technology and farm tools, however, no such risk was present. Since high-tech devices are often highly integrated, a troll only
needs a single and cheap patent to force a large settlement. As for
patent sharks, the costs of acquisition were sharply reduced by the
decision to lower the patentability standard for designs. 95 By removing the obstacles to opportunistic litigation, the Patent Office made it
possible for sharks to flourish.
93 See Jay Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protectionfor IndustrialDesigns, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
887, 892 ("The designer's art focuses not on the creation of new and nonobvious
techniques... but on the use of old ones in well-known ways to develop useful products."). This explains why designers are not satisfied with the application of the "nonobviousness" standard for design patents, which excludes most esthetic
improvements. See David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent-The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 289, 293 (1999) ("[D]esigners believe that design patent protection is inadequate for the task and desire more protection than the law currently
affords.").
94 Another problem is that it is nearly impossible to judge something as subjective
as an artistic breakthrough. See Note, Protectionfor the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility,
72 HAv.L. REV. 1520, 1522 (1959) ("Whereas it may often be possible to recognize a
technological innovation as an 'advance' because of its efficiency in promoting economies or in achieving previously unattainable utilitarian ends, there exist no comparable criteria of 'advance' for artistic creations.").
95 See supra Part H.A.
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In sum, the factors that fuel opportunistic licensors are: (1) a lack
of substitutability by the defendant; (2) a technology typified by incremental improvements; and (3) low acquisition costs. Farm tools and
information technology meet these criteria and demonstrate that
trolls are likely to cluster at each end of the range-very complex and
simple-but not in the vast middle. Andjust as history helped identify
the leading causes of trolls, that tool can also offer guidance on the
potential remedies for this problem.
IV.

TROLLS, REMEDIES, AND TAXES

This Part compares the proposals made in the nineteenth and
twenty-first centuries in response to opportunistic licensing. In both
eras, attempts to address the issue through a recalibration of patent
rights failed because of opposition from firms that were not plagued
by trolls. During the Gilded Age, that insight was ultimately applied
by abolishing the design patents used by sharks. A similar approach
could work for technology patents, but there may be less drastic solutions that would make it too costly for trolls to operate.
A.

Past as Prologue-Anti-Shark Measures and Political Choice

Just as agrarian activists denounced opportunistic licensors in
terms that match contemporary parlance, they also offered a set of
reforms that echo many ideas now being floated to deal with patent
trolls. The most popular idea at this time was to create an innocent
user defense so defendants could not be held liable for infringement
unless they knew that an item was patented. 96 Indeed, the National
Grange petitioned Congress to "amend the patent laws .

.

. to make

the manufacturer or vendor alone responsible for infringement in the
sale of patented articles. '' 97 A related thought was that the exclusive
federal jurisdiction in patent infringement cases should be modified
by establishing a statutory minimum for claims, which would have
effectively ended suits against most individual farmers. 9 8 And there
96 See 11 CONG. REG. 1973 (1881) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) ("I would, ifI had
the power to do it, put in the bill a clause providing that he should make no recovery
of any amount . . . if the defendant established the fact that he was an innocent
purchaser of the article in open market.. . ."); 8 CONG. REc. 1371 (1879) (statement
of Rep. Deering) ("The patent law should be changed as to hold the manufacturer or
vendor, or both, alone responsible to the patentee for infringement of his fights.").
97 10 CONG. Rc. 102 (1879) (statement of Sen. Butler) (introducing the
petition).
98 See8 CONG. REC. 303 (1878) ("[I]f the plaintiff shall not recover the sum of $50
or over, the court shall adjudge him to pay his own costs, unless it shall also appear
that the defendant at the time of such purchase, manufacture, or practical applica-
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was a third plan that involved using compulsory licensing. 99 All of
these reforms sought to curb sharks by making it easier for end users
to find "safe havens" from which they would not have to substitute
from the patented technology. 0 0 Of course, they also all weakened
patent protection across the board.
None of these bills were ever enacted, 10 which should come as
no surprise since the interests unaffected by patent sharks saw no
value in them. A critic who typified conservative opinion explained
that "compelling the patentee to prove that the infringer had notice
of the patent, entirely abolishes and repeals his rights." 10 2 Senator
George Hoar of Massachusetts added that an innocent user defense
was too broad because sharks brought only a fraction of all patent
infringement suits. 1 0

3

He also noted that such a defense would also

apply to railroads that stole a small inventor's idea and then claimed
they were unaware of a patent.10 4 Modern defenders of trolls say that
hampering them would hurt start-ups and help large firms, and symtion, had knowledge or actual notice of the existence of such patent .. ");id. (statement of Sen. Windom) (stating that a similar amendment would "withhold from the
use of patent-owners the circuit and district courts of the United States for the collection of mere frivolous claims unless the claimants pay their own costs").
99 See id. at 308 (statement of Sen. Christiancy) ("There is still another class of
cases in which, for patents hereafter to be issued, to prevent extortion, some rate of
compensation should be fixed by the statute . . . when the infringement consists in
using the thing patented."); Hayter, supra note 10, at 77 ("[A] number of state
granges proposed that, when patents were issued or renewed, a definite royalty fee be
set and paid to the patentee; in return for this payment anyone could construct and
sell such improved machines and thus bring them into immediate use."). Twenty-first
century commentators have also suggested compulsory licensing. See supra note 13
and accompanying text; infra note 106 and accompanying text; cf.Mann, supra note
8, at 1023 (rejecting this but noting that "[a] natural response ... is to limit the right
of trolls to enforce their patents in some way. An obvious possibility is compulsory
licensing, in which a third party sets a 'reasonable' rate at which the patent must be
licensed").
100 In the case of compulsory licensing, the substitution cost would be fixed at a
rate far lower than would be set if the troll held an injunction over a defendant. As
for an innocent user defense (either in substance or through jurisdiction), the cost of
substitution would be zero because there would be no need to substitute.
101 See supra note 17.
102 8 CONG. Rrc. 269 (1878) (statement of Sen. Wadleigh).
103 See id. (statement of Sen. Hoar) (stating that suits against farmers were usually
.not the case to which the patent laws of this country apply").
104 See id. at 270 ("I understand that it is proposed to enact that the inventor of the
air-brake cannot stop a railroad company in this country from its perpetual use unless
he can show that the company had knowledge or actual notice of his patent before
they purchase the article from a man that manufactured it.").
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pathetic legislators in the nineteenth century also wondered if by try10 5
ing to help farmers they would end up aiding greedy trusts.
This take on the issue suggests that any proposal affecting substantive rights is a nonstarter because most patentees are not susceptible to holdups. Whether this is just a fact of interest group politics or
a principled stance that remedies should be tailored to fit harms, the
point flows directly from the observation that only some types of patents are exposed to opportunistic licensors. In the eBay case discussed
earlier, the effort to convince the Court to restrict injunctive relief (a
form of compulsory licensing) was met with a stack of hostile amicus
briefs from groups like the pharmaceutical industry that have no fear
of trolls. 10 6 Similarly, the bills that are languishing in Congress seek to

stop opportunistic licensing by overhauling standards on willful
infringement and injunctive relief while altering the examination process by allowing third parties to challenge patents in an administrative
proceeding. 0 7 These may be good ideas, but as anti-troll measures
they sweep too far and are likely to motivate intense resistance from
many patentees.
One way out of this political morass would be to target any
reforms at the opportunistic licensors themselves, but here there are
major definitional problems. Finding a test that separates trolls, who
are presumably identified by their bad faith, from firms with genuine
interests or grievances is challenging to say the least.' 0 8 Any troll can
seek to avoid that pernicious label by taking on some valid licensing or

105 See id. (statement of Sen. Kirkwood) ("I have no desire to interfere in any contest going on between railroad companies and patentees. Railroad companies are
able to take care of themselves."); supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text; supra note 17. This is tantamount
to compulsory licensing because, once injunctive remedies are unavailable, the only
alternative is damages determined by a court or jury.
107 See Chan & Fawcett, supra note 35, at 7-11 (describing the Patent Reform Act,
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005)). One distinction between the nineteenth century
and today is that past efforts to address opportunistic licensing focused entirely on
substantive change, whereas the current emphasis is on a mix of institutional or remedial reforms.
108 See Qualcomm Inc. & Tessera, Inc. Brief, supra note 8, at 19 ("There is simply
no way to subdivide NPEs [Non-Practicing Entities] into 'good NPEs' and 'bad NPEs.'
There is no judicially-manageable bright line between supposed 'patent trolls' and
inventors who cannot practice their inventions because of resource limitations or
managerial considerations."); Mann, supra note 8, at 1023 ("Although the suits of
trolls frustrate many in the industry, any effort to design a suitable definition of the
term 'troll' is likely to lend credence to the view that the status as a troll is in the eye
of the beholder.").
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research work to confuse the issue.""' More importantly, firms that
are really trying to bring their patents to market but have not done so
are difficult to distinguish from bad actors. "10 This highlights a flaw in
making opportunistic licensors a disfavored class of plaintiffs-that
determination is itself ambiguous. Confronted by a suit from a troll, it
is unlikely that defendants will want to go to trial based on the uncertain prospect that a plaintiff will be penalized for bad faith. Thus, the
arduous task of defining a troll will probably not even pay off.'I'
If the historical parallel between sharks and trolls rings true, then
the obvious implication is that repeal is the only real answer to the
troll problem. This does not mean that we should wipe out all technology patents. A more discriminating approach would focus on the
most problematic of these patents, which deal with software and business methods. 112 Critics of the recent expansion of patent subject
matter into these areas might describe this "experiment" as a disaster
on a par with the design patent fiasco of the 1860s. Indeed, Justice
Kennedy singled out business method patents for criticism in the troll
context due to their "potential vagueness and suspect validity."'1 13
Though there is little doubt that ending these patents would
reduce opportunistic licensing, the more difficult question is whether
abolition is too draconian given the potential benefits of software and
business method patents. 11 4 With respect to the design patents
granted in the past on incremental improvements, there was no real
109 See Law & Econ. Professors' Brief, supra note 8, at 20 ("[O]nce a definition is
put into effect, then the formerly-passive 'trolls' will have an incentive to engage in
modest, arguably inefficient, licensing efforts to preserve their blocking
position ....

).

110 This relates back to the point made before about the need for a grace period
after a patent is granted. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Since it is
unrealistic to expect that patentees will bring their invention to market right away,
there will always be some doubt about whether an action based on a previously unenforced patent is being filed in bad faith.
111 Attacking the problem by enhancing equitable defenses or the remedial discretion of the federal courts will not work for the same reason. Each approach makes it
more likely that a troll will lose at trial, but neither will diminish the uncertainty about
the outcome at the settlement stage.
112 Advocating a repeal of these patents does not mean that software and business
methods must be excluded from intellectual property protection. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 90, at 4-7 (proposing changes in software patents that would move
them towards a sui generis system of protection).
113 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
114 One could also say that the reliance interests (or political clout) of these industries are too great to put any stock in a repeal. See Cohen & Lemley, supra note 90, at
4 ("[S]oftware patentability is a matter for the history books.").
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evidence that they helped anyone.' 15 The only concrete result was a
school of sharks. By contrast, it is hard to say that patents for software
or business methods do not spur creativity in a meaningful way. Abolishing these patents may well cause more harm than trolls do. Without more evidence on the effect opportunistic licensing has on hightech investment, this analysis cannot rule out the possibility that there
is a justification for these technology patents that breaks the parallel
with the design patents that were abolished during the nineteenth
century. In other words, I am an agnostic on this issue, but abolition
is an option that must be taken seriously.
B.

A Dormancy Tax

If eliminating an entire patent class is too hard to stomach, then
the focus should turn to administrative solutions. Improving patent
quality by reforming the examination process can help matters, but
the application process is not the only point where trolls are vulnerable. 1 16 If there are too many dormant patents that can be used to
snare the unwary, then one way that can be resolved is by taxing patents at a higher rate to increase the costs of engaging in opportunistic
behavior.
This proposal to raise the maintenance fees for patents builds on
the existing system. To retain ownership of a patent, the rights holder
must pay a $900 maintenance fee in the fourth year. 1 17 In the eighth
year, the fee goes to $2300, and in the twelfth year it jumps to
$3800.118 Now imagine a scheme in which these fees are sharply
increased and assessed more frequently. The cost of acquiring and
holding patents would skyrocket. As a result, firms would have a
strong incentive to either use their dormant patents or allow them to
lapse and enter the public domain. This would starve trolls of their
sustenance. Furthermore, opportunistic licensers that obtain patents
with the intent of holding them back until others start using the same
technology will pay dearly for their sandbagging. 19 A tax on patents
115 See Magliocca, supra note 15, at 879-81 (making this point and then exploring
the wisdom of property protection for designs).
116 See supra Part III.A.
117 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-(g) (2006); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1525 (2005).
118 Moore, supra note 117, at 1525.
119 A tax is also more effective because it ties the cost of acquisition to the reliance
costs associated with a technology. Trolls that acquire a dormant patent that is ten
years old will pay much more than if the patent is one year old, which reflects the fact
that the longer a patent goes unenforced the more likely it is that others will rely on
the invention as if it were in the public domain.

20071

BLACKBERRIES

AND

BARNYARDS

1837

would not eliminate opportunistic litigation, but it might go a long
way toward bringing the problem under control.
A significant objection to this proposal, of course, is that hiking
the maintenance fees on patents raises the costs of innovation. This is
certainly true, even though the cost of a patent application would not
go up. 120 One response is that trolls already impose a tax on innovation, but one that is unpredictable and concentrated on a handful of
unlucky victims. Changing the fee structure, by contrast, would
spread this burden more evenly and rationally. Moreover, while a fee
increase is not going to please the industries unaffected by trolls, they
may be more likely to accept a reform that does not affect their patent
rights and remedies as the current proposals do. This may be a case
where we need to seek a "second-best" solution that accepts a suboptimal outcome because it can actually be implemented. Reforming
the fee assessment in lieu of abolishing technology patents could be
just what the doctor ordered in this respect.
In sum, the failure of many thoughtful reforms during the nineteenth-century debate on patent sharks shows that a solution focused
on altering substantive rights or remedies cannot succeed. Policymakers should instead direct their efforts at an outright repeal or at
administrative solutions that reduce the number of dormant patents
and their ability to disrupt settled expectations.
CONCLUSION

The cry of "too many frivolous lawsuits" is heard all too often.
Whenever society gives citizens the ability to vindicate their rights in
court, some will seek an advantage that they do not deserve. Most of
the time, this is a necessary cost of providing a remedy, but there are
cases where the costs of this litigation become troublesome. The
problem is that there is usually no context to guide the line-drawing
exercise-lawyers have to go by instinct.
In assessing what to do about patent trolls, this Article went
beyond instinct and pointed to empirical evidence as developed by
decades of experience with an analogous issue during the nineteenth
century. From that history, policymakers can take away important lessons about the causes of opportunistic licensing in patent and the lim120 By keeping the application fee unchanged, the proposal strives for neutrality
between start-ups and large firms. Nobody can deny that small inventors suffer disproportionately from a maintenance fee increase, but it is worth pointing out that
large firms are much more likely to engage in cross-licensing or other activities that
are aided by stockpiles of dormant patents. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
Accordingly, a maintenance fee increase would also affect them in a significant way.
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itations inherent in any attempt at a solution. By considering this
background information before any decisions are made about trolls,
we can avoid some pitfalls and develop a more sensible policy.

